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Social Equity Matters in Payments 
for Ecosystem Services
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Although conservation efforts have sometimes succeeded in meeting environmental goals at the expense of equity considerations, the changing 
context of conservation and a growing body of evidence increasingly suggest that equity considerations should be integrated into conservation 
planning and implementation. However, this approach is often perceived to be at odds with the prevailing focus on economic efficiency that 
characterizes many payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes. Drawing from examples across the literature, we show how the equity impacts 
of PES can create positive and negative feedbacks that influence ecological outcomes. We caution against equity-blind PES, which overlooks these 
relationships as a result of a primary and narrow focus on economic efficiency. We call for further analysis and better engagement between 
the social and ecological science communities to understand the relationships and trade-offs among efficiency, equity, and ecological outcomes.
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Designing instruments capable of protecting the   biodiversity and ecosystem services on which human 
societies fundamentally depend represents one of the great-
est policy challenges of the Anthropocene. Among tra-
ditional conservation strategies such as protected areas 
and community conservation, innovative instruments such 
as payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes have 
been increasingly promoted to incentivize conservation 
and sustainable resource management. PES programs are 
at the center of the contemporary conservation agenda, 
supported by donors (e.g., Norwegian government, World 
Bank), intergovernmental policy bodies (e.g., Convention 
on Biological Diversity), governments (e.g., Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Ecuador, South Africa, Vietnam, China), the private 
sector (e.g., Danone water, Ecotourism Kenya), and nongov-
ernmental conservation organizations (e.g., Conservation 
International, the World Wildlife Fund).
Whereas existing markets and regulatory frameworks 
have largely failed to account for the public values of eco-
systems, such as carbon sequestration and water regula-
tion, PES schemes create new mechanisms to incorporate 
these values in decisionmaking (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). 
They do this by creating new relationships between the 
beneficiaries of ecosystem services and the service provid-
ers responsible for on-the-ground conservation actions. 
Notably, PES schemes often draw on service beneficia-
ries to fund new incentives (payments and nonfinancial 
 benefits) to compensate land managers for the cost of 
ecosystem service provision.
The resulting market logic behind these efforts to save 
ecosystem services by selling them (McAfee 1999) is com-
monly heralded for its potential to recruit and sustain high 
levels of conservation funding. For example, the United 
Nations’ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) program has proposed to channel 
hundreds of millions of dollars through PES schemes for 
forest emissions reductions. PES is also often portrayed 
as superior to traditional conservation approaches on the 
basis of claims that they can be more economically efficient 
(Pattanayak et  al. 2010, Kinzig et  al. 2011). However, this 
view of the efficiency of PES is at odds with a more com-
prehensive understanding of how conservation happens in 
practice—including the interaction with a range of social 
equity considerations.
We highlight the increasingly multidimensional view 
of social equity for conservation and argue that these fac-
tors must be taken seriously—not least because there are 
important causal links between equity and ecological out-
comes. Although experience shows that seemingly ineq-
uitable approaches to conservation can sometimes meet 
environmental objectives, the contexts for conservation are 
changing, and we increasingly appreciate the complexities of 
social–ecological systems. Where incentive schemes over-
look this complexity and the associated feedbacks, they not 
only fail to notice everyday realities but also ignore the vast 
body of conservation experience (Hirsch et al. 2010, Miller 
et  al. 2011, Ban et al 2013). We highlight the instrumental 
roles that equity can play in shaping conservation outcomes 
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and argue that there is a need to better explore the relation-
ships between social equity and the economic efficiency and 
ecological effectiveness of PES schemes.
Multiple dimensions of social equity
Although many conservation interventions have approached 
equity primarily in terms of the distribution of income or 
benefits (Pascual et al 2010), understanding of the social 
equity dimensions of conservation has become increas-
ingly sophisticated with the recognition that equity is mul-
tidimensional (figure  1). For example, equity dimensions 
also include the distribution of burdens, including both 
direct management costs and passive costs, such as reduced 
resource access (Balmford and Whitten 2003). Equity dimen-
sions also involve a range of interrelated nonmaterial values 
(see Chan et al. 2012), including procedural dimensions that 
encompass how and who makes decisions and the recogni-
tion of differentiated social actors’ rights, cultural identities, 
values, and knowledge systems. These facets are under-
pinned by a social and political context in which the existing 
conditions (e.g., power dynamics, gender, education) that 
influence stakeholders’ ability to gain recognition, to partici-
pate in decisionmaking, and to lobby for fair distribution of 
benefits and burdens are considered (figure  1; McDermott 
et  al. 2013). The relative importance of these interrelated 
equity dimensions is context dependent. Nevertheless, these 
types of factors are well-known determinants of people’s 
motivations and behavior (e.g., Fehr and Falk 2002, Wright 
et  al. 2012), and there is broadening recognition that they 
therefore also influence conservation (Pascual et  al. 2010, 
Miller et al. 2011, Halpern et al. 2013). However, the potential 
for integrating these considerations into conservation plan-
ning is obscured when conservation instruments specifically 
prioritize economic efficiency.
The prevailing focus on economic efficiency
In the face of urgent needs and limited resources, incentive-
based conservation schemes (including PES, biodiversity 
banking programs, and tradable permits) are often proposed 
as instruments through which to increase the economic 
efficiency of conservation. Based on idealized models, these 
schemes are often envisioned as flexible, market-like con-
servation mechanisms (Ferraro and Kiss 2002), in which 
ecosystem services (e.g., water, carbon, biodiversity) are sold 
and traded to incentivize voluntary, economically efficient 
conservation (Engel et al. 2008). This view has been embod-
ied, for example, by widespread proposals for trading carbon 
emissions credits from tropical forest conservation (e.g., 
REDD+ policies).
In fact, the efficiency of conservation outcomes through 
PES is rarely evaluated, because it requires complex eco-
logical and economic valuations across scales and beyond 
business-as-usual baselines. Instead, efficiency is often prox-
ied by cost effectiveness, with managers seeking to maximize 
ecological outcomes, given a limited budget (Pascual et  al. 
2010). To this end, a project’s focus should be on targeting 
the most effective ecosystem services providers at the lowest 
cost (Wunder 2006, Engel et al. 2008, Kroeger 2013). Such an 
approach might, for example, prioritize targeting large land-
holders as recipients of PES while excluding conservation 
agreements with smallholders that would be more costly or 
that would yield relatively lower returns. Similarly, such PES 
might also value individual services that are more market-
able (e.g., carbon, water). As in other sectors (e.g., health, 
education), letting the market decide is often considered a 
more efficient governance approach than either regulation 
or public spending (see Stiglitz 2012).
However, there is growing concern that the prevailing 
focus on economic efficiency is at the expense of other 
important dimensions of PES design, including accounting 
for broader ecological function (e.g., Palmer and Filoso 2009) 
and social equity dimensions (Petheram and Campbell 2010, 
Corbera and Pascual 2012, Muradian et al. 2013), including 
nonmaterial values (Chan et al. 2012) and the complexities 
of human–environment interactions that shape ecosystem 
service provision (Raymond et al. 2013). Some proponents 
have argued that environmental goals must not be conflated 
with social objectives that might compromise economic 
efficiency or distract from the environmental aims of PES 
schemes (Wunder et al. 2008, Kinzig et al. 2011). The result-
ing conservation schemes should either adopt a do not harm 
Procedure
Inclusiveness of rule and 
decisionmaking
Distribution
Distribution of costs and 
benefits
Recognition
Accounting for stakeholder 
knowledge, norms, and values
Surrounding conditions that influence actors’ ability 
to participate and to gain recognition and benefits
Context
Figure 1. The four dimensions of social equity:  
(1) Procedure: the degree of involvement and inclusiveness 
in rulemaking and decisions around land management or 
conservation programs. (2) Distribution: the distribution 
of costs, benefits, burdens, and rights derived from land 
management or conservation actions or programs.  
(3) Recognition: the respect for knowledge systems, values, 
social norms, and the rights of all stakeholders in the 
design and implemention of conservation programs.  
(e) Context: the surrounding social conditions (e.g., power 
dynamics, gender, education) that influence the actors’ 
ability to gain recognition, participate in decisionmaking, 
and lobby for fair distribution. These dimensions are based 
on those in McDermot and colleagues (2013).
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approach in which conservation is sought without a decrease 
in equity (Barrett et al. 2011) or in which the equity consid-
erations to be addressed are externalized through separate 
policy instruments (Kinzig et al. 2011).
This efficiency framing of PES remains mainstream within 
many conservation institutions and in many popular por-
trayals of PES, and it conditions how scientists and decision-
makers view and understand PES. Moreover, the approach is 
representative of a broader view in which market-like instru-
ments take an ever-increasing prominence in environmental 
management (McAfee 1999, Muradian et al. 2013).
Contested role of equity in PES framings
However, the exact relationships between equity and the 
outcomes of environmental management and conservation 
programs remain unclear (Miller et al. 2011, Halpern et al. 
2013). This is especially true in the context of PES (Pascual 
et  al. 2010), in which most schemes are relatively recent 
and have not been subject to long-term evaluations. Nor 
is there robust evidence that a market-based approach to 
conservation yields a comparative advantage for sustaining 
ecological outcomes in a cost-effective way (Miteva et  al. 
2012). Nevertheless, narrow efficiency-focused PES designs 
are potentially at odds with lessons from past conservation 
experiences. It is increasingly accepted that integrating social 
considerations into environmental management planning 
is instrumental to achieving more-robust ecological out-
comes (e.g., Chan et  al. 2012, Ban et  al. 2013, Kinzig et  al. 
2013, Redpath et al. 2013). As we illustrate below, divorcing 
equity considerations from PES risks the oversimplification 
of conservation challenges. Framing resource management 
in purely economic terms neglects the fact that PES efforts 
are embedded in complex systems in which other social and 
political processes interact (Hirsch et al. 2010).
Not surprisingly, as PES schemes have evolved, efforts 
have also increased to incorporate equity dimensions into 
their design and implementation. This has emerged in 
response to realities on the ground, public pressure, and as 
part of ad  hoc, learning-by-doing processes. For example, 
REDD+ policies under debate through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change—originally 
driven by a focus on low-cost carbon emissions mitigation—
have evolved to integrate social safeguards (box 1).
Likewise, Costa Rica’s pioneer forest conservation PES 
scheme has increasingly integrated equity dimensions into 
planning. This program, established in the 1990s to engage 
private landowners in forest conservation and regeneration 
and in improved management of unprotected forests, is 
now directed toward redressing inequities that originated 
because larger landowners and corporations dominated the 
scheme (Porras 2010). For example, through the state agency 
responsible for payments, the formal land title requirements 
that excluded many poor farmers have been eliminated, and 
participation in areas with low social development index 
rankings has begun to be prioritized.
Ecuador’s SocioPáramo incentive program is another 
clear example of the shift toward an explicit equity-focused 
PES approach. Established in 2009, the scheme prioritizes 
sites on the basis of the threat of deforestation and their 
relative importance in terms of carbon storage, hydrological 
regulation, and biodiversity conservation, targeting areas 
such as the Tropical Andes and Tumebes-Chocó-Magdalena 
Ecological Outcomes
Social Equity Outcomes
Environmental effectiveness 
(e.g., biodiversity conservation, watershed
protection, carbon stock (enhancement))
Economic efficiency
Long-term sustainability or Permanence
Opportunities
? Local empowerment and
inclusive decision-making (R, P)
? New employmet, income 
generation or diversification and  
poverty reduction (D)
? Recognition of local rights (R) 
? Increased resource access (D)
Risks
? Marginalisation of vulnerable 
stakeholders and exclusion from 
decision-making (R, P)
? Elite capture of benefits (D)
? Exacerbated poverty (D)
? Reduced resource access (D)
? Increased tenure insecurity (P, R)
Negative equity feedbacks
Reduced project legitimacy 
Nonparticipation
Active resistance 
(e.g., sabotage, protest)
Manipulation of rules
Corruption
Positive equity feedbacks
Increased project legitimacy
Increased local buy-in and
participation
Increased accountability 
Greater compliance
Payments for Ecosystem Services
(distribution, procedure, recognition dimensions, surrounding context)
Figure 2. Payment for ecosystem services schemes affect a range of distributional (D), procedural (P), and recognitional 
(R) dimensions of social equity, mediated by the surrounding context (see figure 1). These dimensions represent both risks 
and opportunities of conservation, because equity impacts have the potential to feedback on ecological outcomes.
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equity–efficiency trade-offs and synergies (Pascual et  al. 
2010). Drawing on the literature about PES, other longer-
established conservation instruments (e.g., protected areas, 
integrated conservation and development programs), and 
field experience in tropical developing countries, we illus-
trate the key pathways (distributional, recognition, and par-
ticipation) by which social equity may effect PES schemes’ 
function to shape ecological outcomes (figure 2). The sup-
plemental material further highlights a wider range of cases 
from the literature (including non-PES examples) to further 
illustrate these relationships.
There are cases in which PES schemes have yielded rev-
enue distribution that prioritized the poor (Bremer et  al. 
2014), promoted inclusive decisionmaking, and strength-
ened local resource governance (see box 2). However, there 
are also instances in which PES schemes have had negative 
effects on equity (Porras 2010), associated with a failure to 
recognize and engage key stakeholders, such as indigenous 
peoples and forest-dependent communities (box  1), or 
restrictions on subsistence resource access (figure 2; Ibarra 
et  al. 2011). These negative equity effects are aggravated 
when the risks are perceived as irreversible or irreparable, 
such as the loss of rights to ancestral lands and intracom-
munity conflicts, for which there may not be adequate 
mitigation or compensation (see Chan et al. 2012). In other 
hotspots. However, the scheme also uses rural poverty levels 
to define priority areas, favoring resource allocation among 
indigenous communities and diminishing payments as a 
participant’s land size increases, to reduce strategic rent seek-
ing by powerful and large landholders (Bremer et al. 2014). 
There is therefore a tension between the original theoretical 
underpinning of PES as intended to maximize value for 
money and the realities on the ground, which underlines the 
need to include social equity considerations.
The extent to which these equity dimensions undermine 
conservation objectives constitutes an important part of 
the vigorous debate—among practitioners and academ-
ics—over the scope, optimal design, and implementation 
of PES (Kinzig et  al. 2011, Corbera and Pascual 2012, 
Muradian et al 2013, Wunder 2013). Among the ongoing 
contests over the role of equity in PES, we provide a frame-
work to help structure these debates, future research, and 
project design.
Equity as instrumental to conservation
PES schemes can influence public behavior, values, and 
social norms (Kinzig et  al. 2013) and can yield a range of 
social equity impacts—both positive and negative (Porras 
2010, Bremer et  al. 2014). Many of these equity impacts 
potentially influence ecological outcomes, which creates 
Box 1. Equity impacts feedback on REDD+ scheme function.
As dozens of projects of the United Nations’ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation program (REDD+) have 
emerged across the tropics, policies to leverage financial incentives to reduce tropical deforestation and the associated greenhouse gas 
emissions remain under debate through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). REDD+ policies 
have been developed for their potential to yield low-cost, efficient emissions abatement through which industrialized nations can offset 
their domestic emissions. The associated policies also promise to yield broader cobenefits for biodiversity and other ecosystem services, 
primarily where these geographically overlap with high carbon density forests. 
However, REDD+ policies have also been cited for neglecting the complex social–ecological interactions that can ultimately determine 
ecological functioning and the trade-offs that can emerge among carbon sequestration, other ecosystem services (e.g., biodiversity, 
water provision), and human development priorities (e.g., resource access). Because of a lack of adequate social and environmental 
safeguards and equity-conscious design, there has been widespread concern that REDD+ policies that are focused on low-cost carbon 
emission abatement could have numerous unintended consequences for both broader forest ecology and forest-dependent human 
communities because of changes in the provision of ecosystem services; shifts in conservation funding; and restrictions to community 
rights, resource access, and territorial claims. These prospective negative equity effects have prompted a strong precautionary response 
and mobilization of forest-dependent and indigenous communities to call for social safeguards via active policy engagement and 
protests (Chhatre et al. 2012) (figure 3). As a result, many REDD+ policies and projects are evolving to integrate social safeguards into 
their design. This was exemplified during the UNFCCC’s nineteenth Conference of Parties in 2013, where, after 7 years of debate, the 
parties resolved that participating countries would be required to report on social safeguards prior to accessing payments for ecosystem 
services. 
However, disagreements over these types of equity considerations have yielded feedbacks on early REDD+ implementation: Tensions 
and debates have delayed policy development, postponed pilot projects, compromised trust, and introduced or rekindled conflicts. 
In Ecuador, for example, REDD+ policies now face strong opposition from indigenous peoples. Although the opposition is multifac-
eted, much of it has arisen as a result of a lack of coordinated communication about REDD+ to the indigenous communities, a lack 
of these peoples’ participation in the decisionmaking processes, and their general distrust of government agencies (Reed 2011). The 
risks of indigenous noncooperation or nonparticipation are substantial: Approximately 60% of the remaining forests are on indigenous 
lands. Similar tensions with indigenous and forest-dependent communities have complicated REDD+ implementation in other tropical 
countries, including Indonesia and Panama (see the supplemental material).
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cases, such as in Mexico’s Scolel Té carbon forestry project 
(box 3), PES has yielded mixed positive and negative equity 
impacts. The program has helped to improve rural liveli-
hoods through income-generating forestry but has excluded 
landless residents and women, with a resultant uneven dis-
tribution of PES benefits (Corbera et al. 2007).
Crucially, there is mounting evidence from diverse con-
servation initiatives that these impacts on equity can have 
important feedbacks in terms of how PES schemes function 
(figure 2, supplemental material). For example, greater local 
autonomy over conservation monitoring and enforcement 
have been linked to enhanced project legitimacy (Kanowski 
et  al. 2011), stronger accountability and improved compli-
ance, which yield positive ecological outcomes (figure  2, 
supplemental material). Participatory approaches and delib-
erative conflict management strategies may also improve 
ecological outcomes (see Redpath et  al. 2013, Raymond 
et  al. 2013). Similarly, local perceptions of fairness in the 
distribution of PES benefits have been linked to greater 
scheme credibility and effectiveness and may be even more 
important to a scheme’s success than the actual amount paid 
through PES (box 2; Gross-Camp et al. 2012).
Conversely, PES that negatively affect equity can create 
equity risks that undermine conservation goals (figure  2, 
supplemental material). They can trigger negative feed-
backs that erode the scheme’s legitimacy, reduce stakeholder 
 participation, and result in a range of conservation conflicts 
that can undermine ecological outcomes (see Kinzig et  al. 
2013, Redpath et  al. 2013), such as through rule breaking, 
sabotage, and protest (Brockington and Igoe 2006); the can-
cellation of PES contracts (Ibarra et al. 2011); and corrup-
tion and manipulation of conservation rules (supplemental 
material; cf. Scott 1985). These negative equity feedbacks 
may ultimately undermine a PES scheme’s viability and 
may require ex post enforcement, mitigation, outreach, and 
compensation. This can significantly add to operational 
costs and therefore erode the economic efficiency associ-
ated with PES. There are, for example, prominent examples 
of how the equity risks (both actual and perceived) associ-
ated with recent REDD+ schemes have delayed the projects’ 
implementation, required mitigation, and prompted local 
resistance (box 1, supplemental material).
Perceptions of equity and fairness, and feedbacks on con-
servation are deeply context dependent and are shaped by 
place-specific social norms, by the institutions that mediate 
how interventions play out in practice, and the overall con-
servation and human development objectives. Just as it is 
difficult to generalize across cases, it is also hard to general-
ize across social actors, because what may be an opportunity 
for one stakeholder may represent a risk for another. For 
example, instances of elite capture in the Scolel Té carbon 
project represented significant new economic opportunities 
for the local elites, even if they excluded large parts of the 
community (box 3).
Moreover, equity impacts and feedbacks have to be con-
sidered at different spatial and temporal scales, because these 
are important in defining who experiences benefits and 
burdens and how they do so. For example, the time frames 
over which equity impacts feedback to influence ecologi-
cal outcomes may be beyond the time horizon of a specific 
conservation project. As a result, although equity blindness 
may be deemed adequately efficient in the short-term, the 
a
b
Figure 3. (a) Indigenous peoples and allies from 
Chiapas and the Amazon protest REDD+ in front of the 
Sacramento, California, capital building in October 2012, 
following a California Air Resources Board hearing in 
which they testified on the adverse impacts that REDD+ is 
already having on communities. Photograph: Jeff Conant, 
Friends of the Earth. (b) Recent initiatives to develop social 
impact assessment methods with local communities for 
a REDD+ pilot in Kilwa, Tanzania. Photograph: Adrian 
Martin.
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Box 3. Positive and negative equity outcomes in the Scolel Té carbon forestry project, Mexico.
The Scolel Té carbon forestry project in the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca, Mexico, is the first farmer-driven forest carbon offset proj-
ect in the world (http://ambio.org.mx/scolelte). It creates financial incentives to encourage farmers and community groups to design 
20-year land-use management plans that incorporate forest mitigation activities, such as tree plantations, agroforestry systems, and 
live fences. A focus on community engagement and the livelihood dimensions of payment for ecosystem services (PES) has facilitated 
the project’s expansion to now cover 2400 households in 50 communities across more than 9600 hectares within temperate coniferous, 
temperate broadleaf, and tropical moist forest areas (figure 5).
However, this focus on farmers’ priorities has impinged on some desired ecological outcomes. Farmers tend to focus on timber species 
and monoculture plantations (e.g., Pinus spp., Cedrela spp.), and live fences (e.g., Juniperus lusitanica, Cedrela odorata). This potentially 
feeds back to shape ecological outcomes, because these species often have greater income-generating potential and lower labor costs 
and involve easier maintenance than more-complex and biologically rich agroforestry systems.
Despite attention to many important equity dimensions, in an effort to reduce management costs and increase efficiency, the project 
progressively abandoned an early emphasis on gender equity, originally promoted through the provision of cleaner cook stoves and 
fruit tree seedlings for home gardens. There is also evidence that a failure to address the underlying tenure claims and power dynamics 
within the participating communities resulted in elite capture of the PES scheme. Local elites, whose status is largely determined by 
their local political affiliation and the size of their land holding, largely control the project information, decisionmaking, and access, 
which results in uneven benefit sharing, conflicts among participants and nonparticipants, and limited project up-take (Corbera 
et al. 2007). The ecological implications of this skewed participation remains uncalculated but potentially represent a negative equity 
 feedback associated with lost conservation opportunities as a result of nonparticipation.
Box 2. Considering equity within payments for conservation services in Rwanda.
Nyungwe National Park covers more than 900 square kilometers; is part of one of the largest continuous lower montane forests in 
Africa; and hosts a number of threatened and endemic species, including the owl-faced monkey (Cercopithecus hamlyni). However, the 
region is also densely populated, and the park is subject to various forms of human activity. In the past few decades, the forest has lost 
its apex grazers—buffalo (Syncerus caffer) and elephants (Loxodonta africana)—and has probably lost its apex carnivore, the leopard 
(Panthera pardus). Ecological functions will almost certainly be effected as these losses cascade down through trophic levels. From 
2009 to 2012, a trial payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme in Rwanda provided financial incentives for local people to reduce 
hunting with snares, tree cutting, and mining within Nyungwe National Park (figure 4).
Concerns about social equity were largely addressed by detailed community consultation over key aspects of the PES’s design, such 
that the specific conservation indicators, performance targets, and payment distribution methods varied from site to site. For example, 
at one site, the community chose for the majority of the payment to be managed communally for the public good, whereas, in others, 
they felt it fairer for most of the payment to be distributed equally among all households.
One key finding from this trial was that where PES schemes are designed to resonate with local conceptions of social equity, this might 
bestow the single greatest advantage over traditional fines-and-fences approaches to conservation. The short-term ecological outcomes 
from the scheme were an improvement in the performance of the rest of the park, indicated by reduced hunting and tree cutting. 
However, there was little difference compared with matched locations in which traditional park monitoring was increased but with 
no payments. This confirms that a fortress conservation approach can also achieve ecological outcomes in the short term, at least in 
contexts such as Rwanda, where a combination of high deterrents (including the fear of death) and enforcement work in tandem with 
modernizing political discourses to turn people away from the forest. 
There was, however, an important difference: In the PES trial areas, local attitudes toward both the park and its authorities improved 
significantly compared with those in the matched areas, which suggests that the conservation gains would be more robust in the long 
term. This suggests that the main comparative advantage of the PES scheme came from its legitimacy, a prospective positive equity 
feedback. Although a more efficient PES scheme might have been achieved by differentiating household payments according to house-
hold opportunity costs, in practice, this would have been considered inequitable and illegitimate (Gross-Camp et al. 2012, Martin et al 
2013). Any efficiency gains would likely be short lived if they are not considered fair by the participants.
assessment may change if longer time frames are analyzed. 
Likewise, reducing forest carbon emissions by protecting 
a large tropical forest area and excluding forest-dependent 
communities would likely be deemed unfair to the local 
stakeholders but might be considered positive at other 
spatiotemporal scales, when the implications of global cli-
mate change on future generations are considered. Such 
social spatiotemporal tradeoffs are therefore highly depen-
dent on what and whose fairness criteria are counted (Pascual 
et al. 2010).
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Rescuing equity in an era of efficiency
Governing ecosystem service provision through idealized, 
efficiency-led PES schemes runs the risk of failure as a 
result of the application of single-objective tools to complex 
social ecological phenomena (Ostrom 2007). In contrast, an 
approach in which equity risks are seriously considered, and 
in which positive equity feedbacks are capitalized on, may 
identify synergies and may achieve more-robust outcomes 
that can be sustained over time. However, a broadened PES 
approach must contend with the complex social–ecological 
relationships that mediate ecosystem services provision and 
human well-being (Hirsch et al. 2010).
Such a PES approach necessitates the recognition of the 
multiple dimensions of equity as explicit, intermediate tar-
gets. A PES scheme focused on optimizing environmental 
effectiveness while aware of both equity considerations and 
financial budgetary constraints will likely involve social and 
environmental safeguards to avoid unintended impacts. 
However, safeguards must be binding, enforceable, and 
subject to evaluation (Chhatre et  al. 2012). Experiences to 
date clearly demonstrate the need to move beyond generic, 
voluntary guidelines and do no harm approaches toward 
an approach that explicitly allows equity considerations to 
shape PES design (Ribot and Larson 2012).
This necessitates that conservation efforts better rec-
ognize and engage the multiple stakeholders that use and 
benefit from ecosystem services and the ways in which 
they conceive and construct claims around different equity 
dimensions. For example, efficiency-focused PES design 
might exclusively favor contractual agreements with legal 
large-land titleholders and resource managers. In contrast, 
an equity-conscious approach would also map out the 
broader relationships between benefit flows at multiple 
scales and different actors’ well-being. Such an approach 
would better consider how these other stakeholders, 
including marginalized and resource-poor people, would 
be affected by PES schemes and how they would experi-
ence and react to these changes. It would also help visualize 
how PES incentives are likely to alter relationships with and 
among communities, and between people and nature. At 
a minimum, this type of engagement would require out-
reach and support in order for PES scheme participants to 
meaningfully engage in decisionmaking. This would involve 
access to credible and comprehensible social and ecological 
data, to allow people to weigh their options and contribute 
to decisionmaking in line with free, prior, and informed 
consent principles (Ribot and Larson 2012, McDermott 
et al. 2013).
However, a deeper engagement in participatory PES design 
has been largely neglected to date (Petheram and Campbell 
2010). Indeed, there are considerable challenges to engag-
ing stakeholders in negotiations and conflict management 
(e.g., Redpath et al. 2013) and to understanding the internal 
community inequalities, the empowerment of marginalized 
groups, and the facilitation of participatory decisionmak-
ing. Moreover, the various nonmaterial and noneconomic 
(e.g., religious, relational, cultural, ecological) benefits of 
ecosystems are often difficult to capture and to consider 
within the prevailing market logic and economic valuation 
(Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011, Chan et al 2012). 
Overcoming these challenges would necessitate a broader 
recognition of the diverse values and identities attached to 
ecosystems, beyond economic appraisals that characterize 
the prevailing efficiency-focused design of PES schemes.
Accounting for equity—particularly, the procedural and 
recognition aspects—would entail the integration of partici-
patory decisionmaking tools into PES design (e.g., Petheram 
and Campbell 2010). It may further depend on an adaptive 
governance approach (Kenward et al. 2011). Such a frame-
work would imply a more flexible and dynamic approach to 
a b
Figure 4. (a) Nyungwe National Park, Rwanda. (b) Collecting bamboo (Yushania alpina) from the park is strictly illegal, in 
part because it forms part of the diet of the threatened endemic owl-faced monkey (Cercopithecus hamlynii). This man’s 
family says that they still rely on bamboo crafts, partly because they never received compensation for land taken from them 
when the park was gazetted in 2005. Photographs Adrian Martin.
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PES. It would further prioritize the development of a more 
strategic and systematic approach to adaptive learning and 
to the design of PES mechanisms than the current ad  hoc 
trial-and-error approach documented for most existing PES 
adaptations.
An adaptive approach to PES governance might include 
various interconnected elements. For example, socially 
inclusive decisionmaking in PES could potentially lead to 
schemes that involve flexible contracts that allow for built-in 
periodic renegotiations and termination options. This would 
open the scope for renegotiating targets and objectives in 
light of unforeseen social, economic, and ecological changes 
(Engel et  al. 2008). Such flexibility might be crucial in the 
context of changing market conditions (e.g., commodity 
prices) and evolving participant needs and would be crucial 
in the context of long-term (often decadal) PES contracts. 
In addition, adaptive PES management would depend not 
only on inclusive PES design but also on ongoing monitor-
ing of both ecological and equity impacts or outcomes, likely 
including participatory evaluation (Jack et  al. 2008), with 
an emphasis on known socioeconomically disadvantaged 
groups.
Conclusions
As PES schemes become increasingly popular, there is a clear 
need to integrate the lessons from previous conservation 
instruments, including a greater appreciation for the human 
dimensions of conservation (Kanowski et al. 2011). In addi-
tion to the optimization of scarce financial resources chan-
neled for conservation, PES must be recognized as operating 
as part of complex institutional landscapes in which formal 
and informal norms, policies, regulations, and markets 
interact. Not only must these complexities be recognized, 
but they should be integrated in PES design. In practice, 
emerging PES schemes often bear little resemblance to 
the imagined, efficiency-driven, market-environmentalism 
model, because they operate within everyday cultural, insti-
tutional, and political realities that influence stakeholder 
behavior (Muradian et  al. 2013). Beyond the contested 
theoretical models of economic rationality, on-the-ground 
realities need to inform future research and the further 
refinement of conservation instruments.
However, we must also evaluate the trade-offs associ-
ated with integrating equity dimensions into PES planning. 
Crucially, equity-conscious design potentially increases the 
costs and complexities of conservation, which delay deci-
sions in which actions are urgent or money needs to be 
quickly disbursed. It is necessary to determine to what extent 
and under what circumstances and time scales equity con-
siderations can improve the robustness of conservation and 
environmental management outcomes while offering a net 
economic payback. This type of evaluation will become par-
ticularly important in the context of new mandated social 
safeguards within REDD+ incentive schemes.
Similarly, the viability of equity-blind approaches to con-
servation needs to be more critically assessed. This implies 
identifying circumstances in which conservation successes 
can be achieved with little concern for equity, such as in the 
case of well-enforced protected areas, where conservation 
may still be possible in spite of negative equity impacts. 
These will be cases in which normative or moral rather than 
economic assessments will be required. But the available 
evidence suggests that much conservation operates under 
circumstances in which a sensitivity to equity resonates with 
a concern for ecological effectiveness.
All this calls not only for an expanded knowledge base 
but also for greater research space and strengthened sci-
ence–policy interactions that will improve our understand-
ing of how conservation interventions influence and are 
shaped by behaviors and social norms over time (Kinzig 
a b
Figure 5. Reforestation activities for carbon offsetting and fuelwood collection in an indigenous commons, Chiapas, 
Mexico. The reforestation activities involve tree species that often fail to match the preferred options of women, who are 
primarily responsible for fuelwood collection and who prioritise tree species that deliver higher quality firewood and 
animal fodder, including oak (Quercs sp.) and willow (Salix sp.). Photographs: Esteve Corbera.
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et  al. 2013). This is occurring through growing, vigor-
ous debates about REDD+ forest carbon payments and 
a renewed dialogue over broader PES design (box  1; e.g., 
Kinzig et  al. 2011, Corbera and Pascual 2012, Muradian 
et al. 2013, Wunder 2013). The recently established United 
Nations’ Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) could repre-
sent a particular opportunity to bridge diverse scientific 
perspectives and traditional knowledge systems to better 
inform conservation scheme designs. However, this also 
represents a crucial site for strengthened cooperation 
among ecologists, conservation practitioners, and social 
scientists to better articulate the relationships between 
scheme design and ecological outcomes (see Kinzig et  al. 
2013). Although the debates over PES design have often 
been dominated by economists, input from other social 
disciplines (e.g., anthropology, psychology, sociology, his-
tory) and from the life sciences could potentially facilitate a 
more critical evaluation of the effectiveness and trade-offs 
associated with different PES designs (e.g., Halpern et  al. 
2013). Such evaluations should include a consideration of 
various nonmaterial dimensions (Chan et  al. 2012) while 
also recognizing that decisionmaking will, in many cases, 
also benefit significantly from evaluations in which measur-
able outcomes are considered—to which life scientists can 
undoubtedly contribute.
Incentive-based schemes hold promise—including their 
potential to promote voluntary conservation and to shield 
conservation from its traditional fiscal constraints. In an 
era of global uncertainty and volatility, tough decisions 
about how and where to invest inevitably bring a focus 
on economic efficiency. However, schemes are unlikely 
to succeed in the long term unless they integrate lessons 
learned from experiences on the ground, including lessons 
about social equity. Parallel efficiency–equity debates have 
emerged across several sectors, to interrogate the broader 
relationships among human capital, equality of opportunity, 
and economic prosperity (Stiglitz 2012). Across contexts, 
the evidence increasingly suggests that equity also mat-
ters for instrumental reasons and cannot be removed from 
decisionmaking; they can only be partially and temporarily 
obscured.
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